Voice For Liberty

Tag: TIF districts

  • Americans for Prosperity-Kansas applauds Sedgwick County Commission for rejecting public financing for Bowllagio

    TOPEKA, KAN — The Kansas chapter of the grassroots group Americans for Prosperity applauds the Sedgwick County Commission for rejecting the proposed tax-increment financing (TIF) district for the Bowllagio development in Wichita.

    “We are pleased that Sedgwick County commissioners unanimously voted against public funding for this entertainment development,” said AFP-Kansas grassroots coordinator Susan Estes. “Commissioners apparently realized it wasn’t a good deal for taxpayers in Wichita and Sedgwick County.”

    Estes said this proposed development was another example of a developer receiving several layers of public financing, and that additional public financing would give the Bowllagio developers an unfair advantage over competing businesses.

    “Those who will benefit from today’s vote are the taxpayers and the existing businesses who have worked for years to invest in this community,” she said. “This would have been just another example of government picking winners and losers in the marketplace.”

    Although some may say today’s vote was a “win” for opponents of the TIF district, Estes says it was more of a win for good government.

    “This isn’t a victory in the traditional sense,” she said. “The bottom line is, we believe the Sedgwick County Commissioners today acted in the best interests of their constituents.”

    From Americans for Prosperity-Kansas.

  • Tax increment financing district (TIF) resources

    Resources on tax increment financing (TIF) districts. An updated version of this article is here.

    Wichita should reject Bowllagio TIF district. Wichita should reject the formation of a harmful tax increment financing (TIF) district.

    Wichita TIF: Taxpayer-funded benefits to political players. It is now confirmed: In Wichita, tax increment financing (TIF) leads to taxpayer-funded waste that benefits those with political connections at city hall.

    Tax increment financing (TIF) and economic growth. There is clear and consistent evidence that municipalities that adopt tax increment financing, or TIF, grow more slowly after adoption than those that do not.

    Does tax increment financing (TIF) deliver on its promise of jobs? When looking at the entire picture, the effect on employment of tax increment financing, or TIF districts, used for retail development is negative.

    Crony Capitalism and Social Engineering: The Case against Tax-Increment Financing. Randal O’Toole, Cato Institute. While cities often claim that TIF is “free money” because it represents the taxes collected from developments that might not have taken place without the subsidy, there is plenty of evidence that this is not true. First, several studies have found that the developments subsidized by TIF would have happened anyway in the same urban area, though not necessarily the same location. Second, new developments impose costs on schools, fire departments, and other urban services, so other taxpayers must either pay more to cover those costs or accept a lower level of services as services are spread to developments that are not paying for them. Moreover, rather than promoting economic development, many if not most TIF subsidies are used for entirely different purposes. First, many states give cities enormous discretion for how they use TIF funds, turning TIF into a way for cities to capture taxes that would otherwise go to rival tax entities such as school or library districts. Second, no matter how well-intentioned, city officials will always be tempted to use TIF as a vehicle for crony capitalism, providing subsidies to developers who in turn provide campaign funds to politicians.

    Tax Increment Financing: A Tool for Local Economic Development. Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman. Tax increment financing (TIF) is an alluring tool that allows municipalities to promote economic development by earmarking property tax revenue from increases in assessed values within a designated TIF district. Proponents point to evidence that assessed property value within TIF districts generally grows much faster than in the rest of the municipality and infer that TIF benefits the entire municipality. Our own empirical analysis, using data from Illinois, suggests to the contrary that the non-TIF areas of municipalities that use TIF grow no more rapidly, and perhaps more slowly, than similar municipalities that do not use TIF.

    The effects of tax increment financing on economic development. Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman. Local governments attempt to influence business location decisions and economic development through use of the property tax. Tax increment financing (TIF) sequesters property tax revenues that result from growth in assessed valuation. The TIF revenues are to be used for economic development projects but may also be diverted for other purposes. We have constructed an extensive data set for the Chicago metropolitan area that includes information on property value growth before and after TIF adoption. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we find evidence that cities that adopt TIF grow more slowly than those that do not. We test for and reject sample selection bias as an explanation of this finding. We argue that our empirical finding is plausible and present a theoretical argument explaining why TIF might reduce municipal growth.

    TIF is not Free Money. Randal O’Toole. Originally created with good intentions, tax-increment financing (TIF) has become a way for city officials to enhance their power by taking money from schools and other essential urban services and giving it to politically connected developers. It is also often used to promote the social engineering goals of urban planners. … Legislators should recognize that TIF no longer has a reason to exist, and it didn’t even work when it did. They should repeal the laws allowing cities to use TIF and encourage cities to instead rely on developers who build things that people want, not things that planners think they should have.

    Does Tax Increment Financing Deliver on Its Promise of Jobs? The Impact of Tax Increment Financing on Municipal Employment Growth. Paul F. Byrne. Increasingly, municipal leaders justify their use of tax increment financing (TIF) by touting its role in improving municipal employment. However, empirical studies on TIF have primarily examined TIF’s impact on property values, ignoring the claim that serves as the primary justification for its use. This article addresses the claim by examining the impact of TIF adoption on municipal employment growth in Illinois, looking for both general impact and impact specific to the type of development supported. Results find no general impact of TIF use on employment. However, findings suggest that TIF districts supporting industrial development may have a positive effect on municipal employment, whereas TIF districts supporting retail development have a negative effect on municipal employment. These results are consistent with industrial TIF districts capturing employment that would have otherwise occurred outside of the adopting municipality and retail TIF districts shifting employment within the municipality to more labor-efficient retailers within the TIF district.

    Tax Increment Financing and Missouri: An Overview Of How TIF Impacts Local Jurisdictions. Paul F. Byrne. Tax Increment Financing (TIF) has become a common economic development tool throughout the United States. TIF takes the new taxes that a development generates and directs a portion of them to repay the costs of the project itself. … Supporters of TIF argue that it is a necessary tool for redevelopment in older communities. Detractors contend that it is used to simply subsidize development, and that variances in tax systems allow some governments to implement and benefit from TIF even if its use harms other levels of government. This study provides an overview of the history and basic structure of TIF. It then analyzes the basic tax components of a TIF plan and compares how various aspects, such as tax capture and tax competition, play out in the standard system of TIF. The study then reviews the economic literature on TIF, and ends with a direct application of how TIF operates within Missouri.

    The Right Tool for the Job? An analysis of Tax Increment Financing. Heartland Institute. Tax Increment Financing (TIF) is an economic development tool that uses the expected growth (or increment) in property tax revenues from a designated geographic area of a municipality to finance bonds used to pay for goods and services calculated to spur growth in the TIF district. The analysis performed for this study found TIF does not tend to produce a net increase in economic activity; favors large businesses over small businesses; often excludes local businesses and residents from the planning process; and operates in a manner that contradicts conventional notions of justice and fairness. We recommend seeking alternatives to TIF and reforms to TIF that make the process more democratic and the distribution of benefits more fair to residents of TIF districts.

    Giving Away the Store to Get a Store. Daniel McGraw, Reason. Largely because it promises something for nothing — an economic stimulus in exchange for tax revenue that otherwise would not materialize — this tool is becoming increasingly popular across the country. Originally used to help revive blighted or depressed areas, TIFs now appear in affluent neighborhoods, subsidizing high-end housing developments, big-box retailers, and shopping malls. And since most cities are using TIFs, businesses such as Cabela’s can play them off against each other to boost the handouts they receive simply to operate profit-making enterprises. … At a time when local governments’ efforts to foster development, from direct subsidies to the use of eminent domain to seize property for private development, are already out of control, TIFs only add to the problem: Although politicians portray TIFs as a great way to boost the local economy, there are hidden costs they don’t want taxpayers to know about. Cities generally assume they are not really giving anything up because the forgone tax revenue would not have been available in the absence of the development generated by the TIF. That assumption is often wrong.

    Do Tax Increment Finance Districts in Iowa Spur Regional Economic and Demographic Growth? David Swenson and Liesl Eathington. We found virtually no statistically meaningful economic, fiscal, and social correlates with this practice in our assessment; consequently, the evidence that we analyzed suggests that net positions are not being enhanced — that the overall expected benefits do not exceed the public’s costs.

  • Wichita should reject Bowllagio TIF district

    Update: Video of some testimony from the meeting is here.

    This week the Wichita City Council will consider more economic development through the creation of a tax increment financing (TIF) district. For the good of the city, the council should reject this proposal.

    Supporters of TIF — besides the obvious motivations of the developers who are directly enriched by them — point to the jobs and development that they say TIF creates. But there’s plenty of evidence to the contrary, on both jobs and development. Supporters also say TIF has no cost, which, if true, calls into question the entire justification for taxation. This matter also — again — illustrates the need for pay-to-play laws, as some council members will be voting whether to directly enrich their campaign contributors.

    The city documents for this proposal are at Wichita Public Hearing on the Establishment of the Maize 54 Redevelopment District (Tax Increment Financing).

    Effect of TIF on development

    As far as increased development: Yes, that generally happens within the TIF district. But what about the overall city? The answer is that TIF is harmful. Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman have studied tax increment financing extensively. Their paper The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development bluntly states the overall impact of TIF: “We find clear and consistent evidence that municipalities that adopt TIF grow more slowly after adoption than those that do not.”

    Later in the same paper the authors conclude: “These findings suggest that TIF trades off higher growth in the TIF district for lower growth elsewhere. This hypothesis is bolstered by other empirical findings.”

    Summarizing, the authors write:

    In summary, the empirical evidence suggests that TIF adoption has a real cost for municipal growth rates. Municipalities that elect to adopt TIF stimulate the growth of blighted areas at the expense of the larger town. We doubt that most municipal decision-makers are aware of this tradeoff or that they would willingly sacrifice significant municipal growth to create TIF districts. Our results present an opportunity to ponder the issue of whether, and how much, overall municipal growth should be sacrificed to encourage the development of blighted areas.

    In their later article Tax Increment Financing: A Tool for Local Economic Development, Dye and Merriman further explain the results of their research:

    TIF districts grow much faster than other areas in their host municipalities. TIF boosters or naive analysts might point to this as evidence of the success of tax increment financing, but they would be wrong. Observing high growth in an area targeted for development is unremarkable.

    So TIFs are good for the favored development that receives the subsidy — not a surprising finding. It’s what elected officials, bureaucrats, and newspaper editorial writers can see and focus on. But what about the rest of the city? Continuing from the same study:

    If the use of tax increment financing stimulates economic development, there should be a positive relationship between TIF adoption and overall growth in municipalities. This did not occur. If, on the other hand, TIF merely moves capital around within a municipality, there should be no relationship between TIF adoption and growth. What we find, however, is a negative relationship. Municipalities that use TIF do worse.

    We find evidence that the non-TIF areas of municipalities that use TIF grow no more rapidly, and perhaps more slowly, than similar municipalities that do not use TIF. (emphasis added)

    So if we are concerned about overall growth in Wichita, we need to realize that TIF simply shifts development from one place to another. The overall impact, according to uncontroverted research, is negative: less growth, not more.

    TIF and jobs

    When justifying the use of tax increment financing (TIF districts) elected officials, bureaucrats, and newspaper editorial writers often point to the jobs that will be created. Indeed, when a TIF district is created, economic activity usually happens within the district, and it’s easy to observe people working at jobs.

    But when deciding whether TIF is a wise economic development policy, we need to look beyond the boundaries of the TIF district and look at the effect on the entire economy of the city or region.

    One person who has done this is Paul F. Byrne of Washburn University. He authored a recent report titled Does Tax Increment Financing Deliver on Its Promise of Jobs? The Impact of Tax Increment Financing on Municipal Employment Growth. In its abstract we find this conclusion regarding the impact of TIF on jobs:

    Increasingly, municipal leaders justify their use of tax increment financing (TIF) by touting its role in improving municipal employment. However, empirical studies on TIF have primarily examined TIF’s impact on property values, ignoring the claim that serves as the primary justification for its use. This article addresses the claim by examining the impact of TIF adoption on municipal employment growth in Illinois, looking for both general impact and impact specific to the type of development supported. Results find no general impact of TIF use on employment. However, findings suggest that TIF districts supporting industrial development may have a positive effect on municipal employment, whereas TIF districts supporting retail development have a negative effect on municipal employment. These results are consistent with industrial TIF districts capturing employment that would have otherwise occurred outside of the adopting municipality and retail TIF districts shifting employment within the municipality to more labor-efficient retailers within the TIF district. (emphasis added)

    While this research might be used to support a TIF district for industrial development, TIF in Wichita is primarily used for retail development. When looking at the entire picture, the effect on employment of tax increment financing used for retail development is negative.

    We must conclude that TIF does not meet the goals of increased development and/or jobs, if we consider the impact on everyone. What we’re left with is the well-known problem that public choice economics — the economics of politics — has described: Concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. It’s the reason why those who seek enrichment at Wichita City Hall and other governments make so many political campaign contributions.

    TIF is not free money

    Supporters of TIF usually contend that TIF has no cost. This is not the case. This new development will consume fire, police, and other governmental services, but will not contribute its share of property taxes to pay for these. Instead, some portion of the property taxes will be redirected back to the TIF district to benefit the developers. Others will have to pay taxes to make up this deficit, or will have to accept a reduced level of service. See Tax increment financing is not free money.

    There’s also the “but-for” argument: without the benefit of TIF, the project will not be built, and therefore no tax revenue would be received. It’s a powerful argument, if it were really true. But those who seek this type of government funding can always find a way to make their financial projections “prove” the need for TIF money. Governments then take them at their word.

    We might ask ourselves this question: If TIF is truly without cost, why not have more TIF districts? Why not offer TIF for all new development?

    Maxwell, in particular

    We also need to look at the characteristics of this applicant. The Wichita Business Journal reported this regarding a company Maxwell owned:

    Pixius proposes to repay, over a 10-year period, $1.3 million of a $6.4 million loan from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service, according to court documents. The loan was part of a 2002 Farm Bill pilot program that loaned more than $180 million to ISPs to expand Internet service to rural areas.

    “To my memory … Pixius is the only one (to receive a loan) that’s had to file bankruptcy to work out of its situation,” says Claiborn Crain, USDA spokesman.

    When the government helped out Maxwell in the past, it cost taxpayers $5.1 million in a loan discharged in bankruptcy. His company is set apart from other similar companies in that, according to the USDA spokesman, only Maxwell’s declared bankruptcy.

    I suggest that Maxwell has had his turn at the government funding trough. Taxpayers can’t afford to give him another.

    Wichita Public Hearing on the Establishment of the Maize 54 Redevelopment District (TaxIncrement Financing)

  • Wichita economic development initiatives to be announced

    Tomorrow the Wichita Metro Chamber of Commerce will announce, according to the Wichita Eagle, new economic development initiatives. Said to be the product of months of discussion, past history suggests that the efforts will not be fruitful for the Wichita area. The inclinations of the parties involved in this effort are for more government intervention and less reliance on economic freedom and free markets.

    Do economic development incentives work?

    Judging the effectiveness of economic development incentives requires looking for the unseen effects as well as what is easily seen. It’s easy to see groundbreaking and ribbon cutting ceremonies. It’s more difficult to see that the harm that government intervention causes.

    That’s assuming that the incentives even work as advertised in the first place. Alan Peters and Peter Fisher, in their paper titled The Failures of Economic Development Incentives published in Journal of the American Planning Association, wrote on the effects of incentives. A few quotes from the study, with emphasis added:

    Given the weak effects of incentives on the location choices of businesses at the interstate level, state governments and their local governments in the aggregate probably lose far more revenue, by cutting taxes to firms that would have located in that state anyway than they gain from the few firms induced to change location.

    On the three major questions — Do economic development incentives create new jobs? Are those jobs taken by targeted populations in targeted places? Are incentives, at worst, only moderately revenue negative? — traditional economic development incentives do not fare well. It is possible that incentives do induce significant new growth, that the beneficiaries of that growth are mainly those who have greatest difficulty in the labor market, and that both states and local governments benefit fiscally from that growth. But after decades of policy experimentation and literally hundreds of scholarly studies, none of these claims is clearly substantiated. Indeed, as we have argued in this article, there is a good chance that all of these claims are false.

    The most fundamental problem is that many public officials appear to believe that they can influence the course of their state or local economies through incentives and subsidies to a degree far beyond anything supported by even the most optimistic evidence. We need to begin by lowering their expectations about their ability to micromanage economic growth and making the case for a more sensible view of the role of government — providing the foundations for growth through sound fiscal practices, quality public infrastructure, and good education systems — and then letting the economy take care of itself.

    Other economists have studied tax increment financing (TIF) and have concluded that it is an overall negative factor for the entire region where it is used. Another study found that TIF districts created for retail use had a negative effect on municipal employment.

    Last week Dave Trabert wrote in the Kansas Policy Institute blog: “There’s a very simple reason that these well-intended initiatives haven’t worked: local government and their public-private partners are offering employers what they want them to have instead of what they need to create jobs. The Wichita Chamber’s own survey of business owners said taxes were too high. WIBA’s member survey identified tax and regulatory issues as their top concerns, as did the US Chamber of Commerce. Yet government and their public-private partners ignore what the customer wants because they don’t want the same things.”

    Wichita’s record on economic development

    Earlier this year Wichita Mayor Carl Brewer said that the city’s efforts in economic development had created “almost 1000 jobs.” While that sounds like a lot of jobs, that number deserves context.

    According to estimates from the Kansas Department of Labor, the civilian labor force in the City of Wichita for December 2011 was 192,876, with 178,156 people at work. This means that the 1,000 jobs created accounted for from 0.52 percent to 0.56 percent of our city’s workforce, depending on the denominator used. This miniscule number is dwarfed by the normal ebb and flow of other economic activity.

    It’s also likely that the city’s economic development efforts were not responsible for a large proportion of these jobs. But government still takes credit. Also, the mayor did not mention the costs of creating these jobs. These costs have a negative economic impact on those who pay them. This means that economic activity — and jobs — are lost somewhere else in order to pay for the incentives.

    The mayor’s plan going forward, in his words, is “We will incentivize new jobs.” But under the mayor’s leadership, this “active investor” policy has produced a very small number of jobs, year after year. Doubling down on the present course is not likely to do much better.

    There’s even confusion over whether our efforts are working. In 2005, a Wichita Eagle editorial commented on a GWEDC report: “Among the points in Thursday’s report worthy of pride was this: the observation by coalition president J.V. Lentell that he’s never seen the cooperation on economic development between the public and private sectors as good as it is now. ‘I’m here to tell you, I think it’s on track,’ Lentell said, emphatically.” (July 29, 2005)

    But in January of this year, an Eagle article listed several things Wichita needs, such as free land and buildings, money for closing deals, and a larger promotions budget. The reporter concluded “The missing pieces have been obvious for years, but haven’t materialized for one reason or another.”

    So even if we believe that an active role for government is best, we have to conclude that our efforts aren’t working. Several long-serving politicians and bureaucrats that have presided over this failure: Mayor Carl Brewer has been on the city council or served as mayor since 2001. Economic development director Allen Bell has been working for the city since 1992. City Attorney Gary Rebenstorf has served for many years. At Sedgwick County, manager William Buchanan has held that position for 21 years. On the Sedgwick County Commission, Dave Unruh has been in office since 2003, and Tim Norton since 2001. (Unruh has said he wants to be Wichita’s next mayor.)

    These people all believe in government-directed economic development. We need to hold them accountable.

    Finally, consider Wichita job growth. As shown in the accompanying chart, the growth in government employees has outstripped private sector job growth. The increase in local government employees is particularly striking.

    Wichita job growthWichita job growth. Data is indexed, with 1990 equal to 1. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

    What our leaders want

    I don’t know what will be in the economic development plan, but it is possible — likely, even — that there will be a call for a tax revenue stream for economic development. In February a company location consultant told Wichita leaders “Successful communities need a dedicated stream of money for economic development.” The news story reported “He was preaching to the choir. GWEDC leaders have been saying for some time that now is the time to go to the business community and the public to make the case for more money and resources.” (Consultant: Wichita needs sites, closing fund to lure business, Wichita Eagle February 16, 2012.)

    Wichita leaders continually call for more “tools in the toolbox” for economic development. They have spoken approvingly of a sales tax for such purposes. Money, of course, is what funds the tools.

    At one time local chambers of commerce would oppose tax increases. They would promote free market principles as the way to create a positive business environment. But this year it was the official position of the Wichita Chamber that eight government subsidy programs was not enough for a downtown hotel, and that there should be a ninth.

    A few years ago Stephen Moore wrote a piece for the Wall Street Journal that that shows how very often, local chambers of commerce support principles of crony capitalism instead of pro-growth policies that support free enterprise and genuine capitalism: “The Chamber of Commerce, long a supporter of limited government and low taxes, was part of the coalition backing the Reagan revolution in the 1980s. On the national level, the organization still follows a pro-growth agenda — but thanks to an astonishing political transformation, many chambers of commerce on the state and local level have been abandoning these goals. They’re becoming, in effect, lobbyists for big government. … In as many as half the states, state taxpayer organizations, free market think tanks and small business leaders now complain bitterly that, on a wide range of issues, chambers of commerce deploy their financial resources and lobbying clout to expand the taxing, spending and regulatory authorities of government. This behavior, they note, erodes the very pro-growth climate necessary for businesses — at least those not connected at the hip with government — to prosper. Journalist Tim Carney agrees: All too often, he notes in his recent book, ‘Rip-Off,’ ‘state and local chambers have become corrupted by the lure of big dollar corporate welfare schemes.’”

    Does Wichita have the will?

    Dr. Art Hall, who is Director of the Center for Applied Economics at the Kansas University School of Business has made a convincing case that less government involvement, not more, is needed. He argues that a dynamic economy is what Kansas needs, not one where government directs taxpayer investment for economic growth.

    Hall writes this regarding “benchmarking” — the bidding wars for large employers that are the foundation of Wichita economic development, and the battle for which Wichita is likely preparing: “Kansas can break out of the benchmarking race by developing a strategy built on embracing dynamism. Such a strategy, far from losing opportunity, can distinguish itself by building unique capabilities that create a different mix of value that can enhance the probability of long-term economic success through enhanced opportunity. Embracing dynamism can change how Kansas plays the game.”

    Hall’s paper on this topic is Embracing Dynamism: The Next Phase in Kansas Economic Development Policy.

    We need to recognize that government as active investor doesn’t work. A serious problem with a plan for increased economic interventionism by government is the very nature of knowledge. In a recent issue of Cato Policy Report, Arnold King wrote:

    As Hayek pointed out, knowledge that is important in the economy is dispersed. Consumers understand their own wants and business managers understand their technological opportunities and constraints to a greater degree than they can articulate and to a far greater degree than experts can understand and absorb.

    When knowledge is dispersed but power is concentrated, I call this the knowledge-power discrepancy. Such discrepancies can arise in large firms, where CEOs can fail to appreciate the significance of what is known by some of their subordinates. … With government experts, the knowledge-power discrepancy is particularly acute.

    Relying on economic freedom and free market solutions for economic growth and prosperity means trusting in the concept of spontaneous order. That takes courage. It requires faith in the values of human freedom and ingenuity rather than government control. It requires that government officials let go rather than grabbing tighter the reins of power, as will probably be the key feature of Wichita’s new economic development plan.

    But Wichita’s mayor is openly dismissive of economic freedom, free markets, and limited government, calling these principles “simplistic.” Instead, he and most others prefer cronyism and corporate welfare. That hasn’t worked very well so far, and is not likely to work in the future.

  • In Wichita, a gentle clawback

    Tomorrow’s Wichita City Council meeting will consider a clawback provision for a forgivable loan made by the city. It’s on the consent agenda, so it is unlikely there will be any discussion.

    Clawbacks are mechanisms whereby government can be paid back for the cost of economic development subsidies when companies don’t achieve the promised goals, usually employment levels or capital investment. Officials like to look tough on this issue, so they can say they’re fighting for the interests of the taxpayer. An example is Wichita City Council Member Jeff Longwell, who during his recent campaign was quoted by the Wichita Eagle on this topic: “We need to be consistent with policies that provide a positive return on investment and hold companies accountable with personal guarantees that include claw-back features to protect the taxpayers’ investment.”

    It turns out, however, that clawbacks are often difficult to enforce. The most likely reason a company may not meet employment or investment targets is that the company is not performing well financially. This is the case with a Wichita company that received a forgivable loan of $62,000 from the city five years ago. The company has not met the agreed job levels, so it must repay the loan.

    But, according to city documents: “the severe downturn in the aviation industry prevented the firm from growing its business as projected.” So the city is allowing the company to repay the loan in five annual installments.

    By the way, in 2010 the city granted this company, Burnham Composite Structures, Inc., a property tax exemption worth an estimated $105,746 per year.

    Sometimes the city council simply doesn’t want to enforce clawback agreements. Last year the council granted a bailout to Reverend Kevass Harding and his underperforming tax increment financing (TIF) district. New considerations showed that the project would not generate enough incremental property tax revenue to pay the TIF bonds. This should not have been a problem for the city, as the agreement with Harding contained this provision: “The developer will be required by the development agreement to provide satisfactory guarantees for the payment of any shortfall in TIF revenues available for debt service on all ‘full faith and credit’ TIF bonds issued by the City for this TIF district.”

    So the city could have held Harding to his promise and taxpayers wouldn’t be hurt, at least not any more than the formation of the TIF district itself hurt.

    Despite this provision, the city refinanced the TIF debt using the city’s debt service fund, charging Harding and his partners the same interest rate the city itself pays. See Ken-Mar TIF district, the bailouts.

  • Wichita-area economic development policy changes proposed

    The City of Wichita and Sedgwick County are considering a revision to their economic development policies. Instead of promoting economic freedom and a free-market approach, the proposed policy gives greater power to city bureaucrats and politicians, and is unlikely to produce the economic development that Wichita needs.

    A new feature of the proposed policy implements property tax forgiveness for speculative industrial buildings, with a formula that grants a higher percentage of tax forgiveness as building size increases. And, in a stroke of pure bureaucratic central planning, the ceilings of these buildings must be at least 28 feet high.

    The policy requires that projects have an estimated ratio of public benefits to public costs of at least 1.3 to 1, although there are factors that allow exceptions. This ratio should be met for both the city’s general fund, and its debt service fund. This — if the city actually enforces this — would be a welcome change. But within the last year, the city ignored a large negative cost-benefit ratio for the Ambassador Hotel, and instead used a positive ratio for the city’s general fund. See Fact checking the Wichita Ambassador Hotel campaign.

    Wichitans also need to realize that the “benefits” in the calculation are in the form of increased tax revenue paid to the city, county, etc. There is no consideration of actually rewarding the taxpayers that pay for — and assume the risk of — economic development incentives.

    There is also the curious focus on jobs that pay above-average wages. But what about workers who don’t have the skills to earn above-average wages? Shouldn’t they be able to benefit from the city’s economic development efforts?

    There is also the focus on exports: “A ‘Value-Added Job’ produces goods and/or services that are sold predominately outside of the MSA. Importing wealth into the community through value added jobs grows the local economy. Whereas non-value-added jobs typically re-circulate wealth within the community.” This is reminiscent of mercantilism, an economic strategy where exports are prized and imports are discouraged. It ignores the benefit that Wichitans receive from trading with themselves.

    There are also targeted industries and a list of eligible business activities.

    Clawbacks — the recovery of incentives if a company fails to live up to its agreed-to goals — are important in the new proposed policy. But the city has had clawbacks in effect, in the form of personal guarantees from TIF developers, for example. But last year the city decided not to enforce that agreement, and instead refinanced the debt at credit risk to the city.

    The record on economic development

    Earlier this year Greater Wichita Economic Development Coalition issued its annual report on its economic development activities for the year. The shows us that power of government to influence economic development is weak. In its recent press release, the organization claimed to have created 1,509 jobs in Sedgwick County during 2011. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the labor force in Sedgwick County in 2011 was 253,940 persons. So the jobs created by GWEDC’s actions amounted to 0.59 percent of the labor force. This is a very small fraction, and other economic events are likely to overwhelm these efforts.

    In his 2012 State of the City address, Brewer took credit for creating a similar percentage of jobs in Wichita.

    Rarely mentioned are the costs of creating these jobs. These costs have a negative economic impact on those who pay these costs. This means that economic activity and jobs are lost somewhere else in order to pay for the incentives.

    Also, at least some of these jobs would have been created without the efforts of GWEDC. All GWEDC should take credit for is the marginal activity that it purportedly created. Government usually claims credit for all that is good, however.

    Danger going forward

    The danger we in the Wichita area face is the overwhelming urge of politicians to be seen doing something. For example, in response to the departure of Boeing, Wichita Mayor Carl Brewer called for the community to “launch an aggressive campaign of job recruitment and retention.”

    It is likely that we will become susceptible to large-scale government interventions in an attempt to gain new jobs. Our best course would be to take steps to make Kansas and Wichita an inviting place for all firms to do business. The instinct of politicians and bureaucrats, however, is to take action, usually in the form of targeted incentives as a way to spur economic development.

    We’ve seen the disappointing results — not only with Boeing, but also in a report showing that Wichita has declined in economic performance compared to other areas.

    These targeted economic development efforts fail for several reasons. First is the knowledge problem, in that government simply does not know which companies are worthy of public investment. In the case of the Wichita and Sedgwick County policy, do we really know which industries should be targeted? Are we sure about the list of eligible business activities? Is 1.3 to 1 really the benchmark we should seek, or we be better off and have more jobs if we insisted on 1.4 to 1 or relaxed the requirement to 1.2 to 1?

    This lack of knowledge, however, does not stop governments from creating policies for the awarding of incentives. This “active investor” approach to economic development is what has led to companies escaping hundreds of millions in taxes — taxes that others have to pay. That has a harmful effect on other business, both existing and those that wish to form.

    Embracing Dynamism: The Next Phase in Kansas Economic Development Policy

    Professor Art Hall of the Center for Applied Economics at the Kansas University School of Business is critical of this approach to economic development. In his paper Embracing Dynamism: The Next Phase in Kansas Economic Development Policy, Hall quotes Alan Peters and Peter Fisher: “The most fundamental problem is that many public officials appear to believe that they can influence the course of their state and local economies through incentives and subsidies to a degree far beyond anything supported by even the most optimistic evidence. We need to begin by lowering expectations about their ability to micro-manage economic growth and making the case for a more sensible view of the role of government — providing foundations for growth through sound fiscal practices, quality public infrastructure, and good education systems — and then letting the economy take care of itself.”

    In the same paper, Hall writes this regarding “benchmarking” — the bidding wars for large employers that Wichita and other cities engage in: “Kansas can break out of the benchmarking race by developing a strategy built on embracing dynamism. Such a strategy, far from losing opportunity, can distinguish itself by building unique capabilities that create a different mix of value that can enhance the probability of long-term economic success through enhanced opportunity. Embracing dynamism can change how Kansas plays the game.”

    In making his argument, Hall cites research on the futility of chasing large employers as an economic development strategy: “Large-employer businesses have no measurable net economic effect on local economies when properly measured. To quote from the most comprehensive study: ‘The primary finding is that the location of a large firm has no measurable net economic effect on local economies when the entire dynamic of location effects is taken into account. Thus, the siting of large firms that are the target of aggressive recruitment efforts fails to create positive private sector gains and likely does not generate significant public revenue gains either.’”

    There is also substantial research that is it young firms — distinguished from small business in general — that are the engine of economic growth for the future. We can’t detect which of the young firms will blossom into major success — or even small-scale successes. The only way to nurture them is through economic policies that all companies can benefit from. Reducing tax rates is an example of such a policy. Abating taxes for specific companies through programs like IRBs and other economic development programs is an example of precisely the wrong policy.

    We need to move away from economic development based on this active investor approach. We need to advocate for policies — at Wichita City Hall, at the Sedgwick County Commission, and at the Kansas Statehouse — that lead to sustainable economic development. We need political leaders who have the wisdom to realize this, and the courage to act appropriately. Which is to say, to not act in most circumstances. Wichita and Sedgwick County are moving in the wrong direction.

  • Sedgwick County will hold Southfork TIF hearing

    Since the Wichita City Council passed a resolution authorizing the formation of the Southfork tax increment financing district, the affected county (Sedgwick) and school district (Wichita) have an opportunity to veto the district’s formation. They don’t have to take action to approve the district — only silent assent is required. But they can take action, as Sedgwick County did in January, to cancel the formation of the district.

    At Tuesday’s commission staff meeting, commission chair Tim Norton along with commissioners Dave Unruh and Jim Skelton didn’t believe a public hearing was necessary the matter should not be placed on the agenda. That would mean the county gave its silent consent to the district’s formation.

    But after learning of that action, myself and at least two others contacted the county manager’s office and asked to be placed on the public agenda portion of the meeting, where citizens may address any topic.

    Whether we would be allowed to speak was touch-and-go. County policy is that speakers must “provide your request in writing to the Sedgwick County Manager’s Office at least nine days prior to the meeting date.” The emphasis is in the original. (I wonder if email counts as writing?)

    (That lengthy nine day lead time is a problem in itself. I believe that good public policy requires that the lead time be at least one day less than the period between meetings of the body, which is case of this commission, is normally seven days.)

    But late Tuesday someone at the courthouse had a change of heart or mind, and now there will be a public hearing on Wednesday May 9th on this matter. Strictly speaking, it’s not a public hearing, but the item will be on the agenda, and it’s anticipated that chairman Norton will allow the public to address the commissioners on this issue.

    I can understand (but not approve of) the motives of the three commissioners who approve of this district not wanting to hear members of the public speak against this item and their policies. Especially when the public has shown their skepticism on these matters, an example being the vote turning down an incentive for the Wichita Ambassador Hotel. In that election, voters repudiated the big-spending, big-government programs of the liberal Republicans on the Wichita City Council. If citizens could vote on the formation of this TIF ddistrict, commissioners Skelton and Unruh might find themselves in the same situation.

  • Thinking beyond stage one in economic development for Wichita

    Critics of the economic development policies in use by the City of Wichita are often portrayed as not being able to see and appreciate the good things these policies are producing, even though they are unfolding right before our very eyes. The difference is that some look beyond the immediate — what is seen — and ask “And then what will happen?” — looking for the unseen.

    Thomas Sowell explains the problem in a passage from the first chapter of Applied economics: thinking beyond stage one:

    When we are talking about applied economic policies, we are no longer talking about pure economic principles, but about the interactions of politics and economics. The principles of economics remain the same, but the likelihood of those principles being applied unchanged is considerably reduced, because politics has its own principles and imperatives. It is not just that politicians’ top priority is getting elected and re-elected, or that their time horizon seldom extends beyond the next election. The general public as well behaves differently when making political decisions rather than economic decisions. Virtually no one puts as much time and close attention into deciding whether to vote for one candidate rather than another as is usually put into deciding whether to buy one house rather than another — or perhaps even one car rather than another.

    The voter’s political decisions involve having a minute influence on policies which affect many other people, while economic decision-making is about having a major effect on one’s own personal well-being. It should not be surprising that the quantity and quality of thinking going into these very different kinds of decisions differ correspondingly. One of the ways in which these decisions differ is in not thinking through political decisions beyond the immediate consequences. When most voters do not think beyond stage one, many elected officials have no incentive to weigh what the consequences will be in later stages — and considerable incentives to avoid getting beyond what their constituents think and understand, for fear that rival politicians can drive a wedge between them and their constituents by catering to public misconceptions.

    The economic decisions made by governing bodies like the Wichita City Council have a large impact on the lives of Wichitans. But as Sowell explains, these decisions are made by politicians for political reasons.

    Sowell goes on to explain the danger of stopping the thinking process at stage one:

    When I was an undergraduate studying economics under Professor Arthur Smithies of Harvard, he asked me in class one day what policy I favored on a particular issue of the times. Since I had strong feelings on that issue, I proceeded to answer him with enthusiasm, explaining what beneficial consequences I expected from the policy I advocated.

    “And then what will happen?” he asked.

    The question caught me off guard. However, as I thought about it, it became clear that the situation I described would lead to other economic consequences, which I then began to consider and to spell out.

    “And what will happen after that?” Professor Smithies asked.

    As I analyzed how the further economic reactions to the policy would unfold, I began to realize that these reactions would lead to consequences much less desirable than those at the first stage, and I began to waver somewhat.

    “And then what will happen?” Smithies persisted.

    By now I was beginning to see that the economic reverberations of the policy I advocated were likely to be pretty disastrous — and, in fact, much worse than the initial situation that it was designed to improve.

    Simple as this little exercise may sound, it goes further than most economic discussions about policies on a wide range of issues. Most thinking stops at stage one.

    We see stage one thinking all the time when looking at government. In Wichita, for example, a favorite question of city council members seeking to justify their support for government intervention such as a tax increment financing (TIF) district or some other form of subsidy is “How much more tax does the building pay now?” Or perhaps “How many jobs will (or did) the project create?”

    These questions, and the answers to them, are examples of stage one thinking. The answers are easily obtained and cited as evidence of the success of the government program.

    But driving by a store or hotel in a TIF district and noticing a building or people working at jobs does not tell the entire story. Using the existence of a building, or the payment of taxes, or jobs created, is stage one thinking, and no more than that.

    Fortunately, there are people who have thought beyond stage one, and some concerning local economic development and TIF districts. And what they’ve found should spur politicians and bureaucrats to find ways to move beyond stage one in their thinking.

    An example are economists Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman, who have studied tax increment financing extensively. Their article Tax Increment Financing: A Tool for Local Economic Development states in its conclusion:

    TIF districts grow much faster than other areas in their host municipalities. TIF boosters or naive analysts might point to this as evidence of the success of tax increment financing, but they would be wrong. Observing high growth in an area targeted for development is unremarkable.

    So TIFs are good for the favored development that receives the subsidy — not a surprising finding. What about the rest of the city? Continuing from the same study:

    If the use of tax increment financing stimulates economic development, there should be a positive relationship between TIF adoption and overall growth in municipalities. This did not occur. If, on the other hand, TIF merely moves capital around within a municipality, there should be no relationship between TIF adoption and growth. What we find, however, is a negative relationship. Municipalities that use TIF do worse.

    We find evidence that the non-TIF areas of municipalities that use TIF grow no more rapidly, and perhaps more slowly, than similar municipalities that do not use TIF.

    In a different paper (The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development), the same economists wrote “We find clear and consistent evidence that municipalities that adopt TIF grow more slowly after adoption than those that do not. … These findings suggest that TIF trades off higher growth in the TIF district for lower growth elsewhere. This hypothesis is bolstered by other empirical findings.”

    Here we have an example of thinking beyond stage one. The results are opposite of what one-stage thinking produces.

    Some city council members are concerned about creating jobs, and are swayed by the promises of developers that their establishments will employ a certain number of workers. Again, this thinking stops at stage one. But others have looked farther, as has Paul F. Byrne of Washburn University. The title of his recent report is Does Tax Increment Financing Deliver on Its Promise of Jobs? The Impact of Tax Increment Financing on Municipal Employment Growth, and in its abstract we find this conclusion regarding the impact of TIF on jobs:

    Increasingly, municipal leaders justify their use of tax increment financing (TIF) by touting its role in improving municipal employment. However, empirical studies on TIF have primarily examined TIF’s impact on property values, ignoring the claim that serves as the primary justification for its use. This article addresses the claim by examining the impact of TIF adoption on municipal employment growth in Illinois, looking for both general impact and impact specific to the type of development supported. Results find no general impact of TIF use on employment. However, findings suggest that TIF districts supporting industrial development may have a positive effect on municipal employment, whereas TIF districts supporting retail development have a negative effect on municipal employment. These results are consistent with industrial TIF districts capturing employment that would have otherwise occurred outside of the adopting municipality and retail TIF districts shifting employment within the municipality to more labor-efficient retailers within the TIF district.

    While this research might be used to support a TIF district for industrial development, TIF in Wichita is primarily used for retail development. And, when thinking beyond stage one, the effect on employment — considering the entire city — is negative.

    It’s hard to think beyond stage one. It requires considering not only the seen, but also the unseen, as Frederic Bastiat taught us in his famous parable of the broken window. But over and over we see how politicians at all levels of government stop thinking at stage one. This is one of the many reasons why we need to return as much decision-making as possible to the private sector, and drastically limit the powers of politicians and governments.

  • Southfork TIF should, again, be rejected

    Tomorrow the Wichita City Council considers the formation of a tax increment financing (TIF) district in south Wichita. Known as the Southfork TIF District, the developer is Wichitan Jay Maxwell. His agent is Tim Austin.

    The TIF proposal has been revised since it was approved by the Wichita city council last December, but rejected by the Sedgwick County Commission in January. Like all TIF districts, this form of government intervention in the economy does more harm than good, and should be rejected.

    TIF is not free money

    Supporters of TIF usually contend that TIF has no cost. This is not the case. This new development will consume fire, police, and other governmental services, but will not contribute its share of property taxes to pay for these. Instead, some portion of the property taxes will be redirected back to the TIF district to benefit the developers. Others will have to pay taxes to make up this deficit, or will have to accept a reduced level of service. See Tax increment financing is not free money.

    There’s also the “but-for” argument: without the benefit of TIF, the project will not be built, and therefore no tax revenue would be received. It’s a powerful argument, if it were really true. But those who seek this type of government funding can always find a way to make their financial projections “prove” the need for TIF money. Governments then take them at their word.

    We might ask ourselves this question: If TIF is truly without cost, why not have more TIF districts? Why not offer TIF for all new development?

    The role of politics

    Maxwell and Austin have some queer ideas regarding the nature of markets and politics. In an email message to supporters of the Southfork TIF, Austin wrote: “There are many underlying political winds working against the Southfork TIF.” In another email message, he wrote: “As I mentioned previously, there are underlying political interests at play that appear to be making this a political matter as opposed to a vote the merits of the TIF, the project, and South Wichita.”

    Austin has it exactly backwards. It is he and Maxwell who are arguing for using the political process to enrich themselves. Those such as myself who oppose government interventions like TIF are arguing against using the political process — against making this a political matter, that is.

    The supporters of government intervention such as TIF often make claims of “market failure.” They claim that the free market system has failed to deliver what they want, so they make appeals to government to intervene. This moves society away from markets and civil society and toward politics and cronyism.

    In reality, markets do quite well in allocating the resources of our economy, despite the claims of many, including historians who should know better. There are those who may feel they’re not getting everything they deserve through the market process, but that’s no reason to introduce the tremendous inefficiencies and distortions that the political process brings with it. In his book How Capitalism Saved America: The Untold History of Our Country, From the Pilgrims to the Present, Thomas J. DiLorenzo explained:

    Most historians also uncritically repeat the claim that government subsidies were necessary to building America’s transcontinental railroad industry, steamship industry, steel industry, and other industries. But while clinging to this “market failure” argument, they ignore (or at least are unaware of) the fact that market entrepreneurs performed quite well without government subsidies. They also ignore the fact that the subsidies themselves were a great source of inefficiency and business failure, even though they enriched the direct recipients of the subsidies and advanced the political careers of those who dished them out.

    Political entrepreneurs and their governmental patrons are the real villains of American business history and should be portrayed as such. They are the real robber barons.

    The idea of “market failure” is used by the promoters of this TIF district. They claim that only government — that is, politics — can make things right, at least according to their vision.

    Political entrepreneurs, by the way, are those who seek their profits through government, not markets. Instead of seeking to create products and services that please customers, they seek to please politicians and bureaucrats. This move away from market entrepreneurship to political entrepreneurship is especially sad in Wichita, where we have a proud tradition of market entrepreneurs with famous names: Lloyd Stearman, Walter Beech, Clyde Cessna, W.C. Coleman, Albert Alexander Hyde, Dan and Frank Carney, Fred C. Koch, and many others.

    Do TIF districts work?

    In deciding whether TIF districts “work” we must come to an agreement of what “work” means. Generally, most supporters of TIF — besides the obvious motivations of the developers who are directly enriched by them — claim increased development and jobs.

    But there’s plenty of evidence to the contrary.

    As far as increased development: Yes, that generally happens within the TIF district. But what about the overall city? The answer is that TIF is harmful.

    Regarding the effect of tax increment financing (TIF) districts on economic development, economists Richard F. Dye and David F. Merriman have studied the issue extensively. Their paper The Effects of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Development bluntly states the overall impact of TIF: “We find clear and consistent evidence that municipalities that adopt TIF grow more slowly after adoption than those that do not.”

    Later in the same paper the authors conclude: “These findings suggest that TIF trades off higher growth in the TIF district for lower growth elsewhere. This hypothesis is bolstered by other empirical findings.” More on their work is at Tax increment financing (TIF) and economic growth.

    Others may support TIF for its purported positive impact on employment. Sure, it’s easy to drive by a TIF district and see people at work. But that doesn’t tell the whole story.

    One person who looked at the effect of TIF on employment in the entire city is economist Paul F. Byrne. He concluded this: “Results find no general impact of TIF use on employment. However, findings suggest that TIF districts supporting industrial development may have a positive effect on municipal employment, whereas TIF districts supporting retail development have a negative effect on municipal employment.”

    More on his work is at Does tax increment financing (TIF) deliver on its promise of jobs?

    We must conclude that TIF does not meet the goals of increased development and/or jobs, if we consider the impact on everyone. What we’re left with is the well-known problem that public choice economics — the economics of politics — has described: Concentrated benefits and dispersed costs. It’s the reason why those who seek enrichment at Wichita City Hall and other governments make so many political campaign contributions.

    This particular applicant

    We also need to look at the characteristics of this applicant. The Wichita Business Journal reported this regarding a company Maxwell owned:

    Pixius proposes to repay, over a 10-year period, $1.3 million of a $6.4 million loan from the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Rural Utilities Service, according to court documents. The loan was part of a 2002 Farm Bill pilot program that loaned more than $180 million to ISPs to expand Internet service to rural areas.

    “To my memory … Pixius is the only one (to receive a loan) that’s had to file bankruptcy to work out of its situation,” says Claiborn Crain, USDA spokesman.

    When the government helped out Maxwell in the past, it cost taxpayers $5.1 million in a loan discharged in bankruptcy. His company is set apart from other similar companies in that, according to the USDA spokesman, only Maxwell’s declared bankruptcy.

    I suggest that Maxwell has had his turn at the government funding trough. Taxpayers can’t afford to give him another.