Voice For Liberty

Tag: Chemical facility anti-terrorism standards

  • Greenpeace and allies again attack Koch Industries

    Last week saw the release of two reports criticizing Koch Industries for its opposition to heavy-handed regulation of the chemical industry. Greenpeace released a report with highly charged words in its title: “Toxic Koch: Keeping Americans at Risk of a Poison Gas Disaster.” Other articles commenting on this were highly sensational, such as this example: “Do the Koch Brothers Want a Toxic Disaster?”

    Koch Industries has responded to these articles in a response on KochFacts.com website. Among many facts, we can see that Koch companies have received 386 safety awards and 28 environmental awards just since President Obama took office.

    Much of the Greenpeace report criticized Koch for its opposition to H.R. 2868, the Chemical and Water Security Act of 2009. Koch and most of the chemical industry instead favored continuation of Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, a set of less intrusive standards that have been effective.

    Greenpeace characterizes the regulatory measures in H.R. 2868 as so mild that it can’t imagine why anyone would object. At issue is a concept known as “Inherently Safer Technology” or IST. If passed into law or regulation, regulators could require manufacturers to substitute alternative processes, in the name of safety. That, however, poses many problems, as explained below.

    The Greenpeace report contains an economic analysis of what H.R. 2868 might do to the economy. This bill passed the House of Representatives, but not the Senate. The report estimates that the cost of IST would be slightly less than $1 billion per year. The analysis concludes that the extra costs of IST regulation would eliminate jobs, but the extra spending on IST would add roughly the same number of jobs. The net impact is therefore zero.

    But we shouldn’t infer that a net loss of zero jobs means no economic harm is done. There will be dislocation, as the people who gain jobs won’t likely be the people who lost jobs.

    But most importantly, this extra cost is spent paying for something that isn’t a problem. The Greenpeace report concedes there have been no attacks on U.S. chemical plants since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The reports says various terrorists would like to conduct such attacks. That’s hardly news. What is news is that, for whatever reason, they haven’t succeeded.

    It’s true that the words “Inherently Safer Technology” don’t appear in H.R. 2868. But in an explanatory document produced by Greenpeace, we see the bill isn’t as mild as Greenpeace claims: “If a facility disagrees with the DHS’s finding they have 120 days to appeal and the DHS must consult with a wide range of experts and those expert recommendations must be included in any order to implement safer chemical processes.” (emphasis added)

    That sounds like heavy-handed regulation and the implementation of IST. Or maybe it’s just wishful thinking on Greenpeace’s part. At any rate, once initiated these regulatory regimes have a way of growing, often far exceeding the intent of Congress when it passed the legislation creating the initial regulation.

    But that’s the goal of the political left: Regulation. And if they can accomplish this goal while at the same time beating up on Koch Industries, the chemical industry, the oil industry, and capitalism in general, so much the better for them. Underlying the quest of Greenpeace and its allies is a hatred of capitalism, hated so much that they will do whatever it takes to discredit and defeat its proponents and practitioners.

    The problems with Inherently Safer Technology regulation

    A document titled Final Report: Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use supplies some useful information about IST:

    IST’s are relative: A technology can only be described as inherently safer when compared to a different technology, including a description of the hazard or set of hazards being considered, their location, and the potentially affected population. A technology may be inherently safer than another with respect to some hazards while being inherently less safe with respect to others, and may not be safe enough to meet societal expectations.

    IST’s are based on an informed decision process: Because an option may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less safe with regard to others, decisions about the optimum strategy for managing risks from all hazards are required. The decision process must consider the entire life cycle, the full spectrum of hazards and risks, and the potential for transfer of risk from one impacted population to another.

    This hints at the difficulty in regulating complex processes such as manufacturing. There may be many tradeoffs to make. An an example, a process might use a toxic catalyst. It would seem that eliminating its use would lead to greater safety.

    But: the tradeoff. Eliminating the use of the catalyst would mean the company has to increase the temperature and pressure of the process, two factors that increase risk. The end result might be a process with more risk than the original process.

    At a committee hearing in 2009, Senator Susan M. Collins gave another example of how IST might force more hazardous trucks on highways:

    According to one water utility located in an isolated area of the Northwest, if Congress were to force it to replace its use of gaseous chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, then the utility would have to use as much as seven times the current quantity of treatment chemicals to achieve comparable water quality results. In turn, the utility would have to arrange for many more bulk chemical deliveries, by trucks, into the watershed. The greater quantities of chemicals and increased frequency of truck deliveries would heighten the risk of an accident resulting in a chemical spill into the watershed. In fact, the accidental release of sodium hypochlorite into the watershed would likely cause greater harm to soils, vegetation and streams than a gaseous chlorine release in this remote area.

    In its discussion on IST, the “Final Report: Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use” report notes the tradeoffs that are commonplace:

    IST options can be location and release scenario dependent, and different potentially exposed populations may not agree on the relative inherent safety characteristics of the same set of options. For example, two options for handling a toxic gas might be receiving the material in ten, 1-ton cylinders or one, 10-ton truckloads. To a population several miles from the site, the 1-ton cylinders would be inherently safer because the maximum potential release size is smaller and less likely to expose them to a hazardous concentration of the gas. However, operators, who would now have to connect and disconnect 10 cylinders for every 10 tons of material used, instead of a single truck, would consider the truck shipments to be inherently safer. Thus, evaluation of IST options can be quite complex, and dependent on the local environment. There is currently no consensus on either a quantification method for IST or a scientific assessment method for evaluation of IST options.

    We need to consider also who is in the best position to judge the relative risks: government bureaucrats, or the operators of the plant. The view of government regulators is that any risk is bad, and through technology — IST in this example — we can eliminate risk.

    But this ignores the tradeoffs involved, as illustrated above. It also ignore the costs of these regulations in their attempt to lessen risk, notwithstanding the economic analysis commissioned by Greenpeace.

    A common response we see in the media — certainly we see it from the political left and attack groups like Greenpeace as well as government regulators — is that greedy plant owners will use whichever method is cheapest, so as to produce the greatest profit.

    This ignores the fact that there are laws and regulations already in place. It ignores the fact that market forces give plant operators a huge incentive to operate safely, for their own safety, the safety of the employees they can’t operate without, and the safety of the surrounding communities. Besides the potential loss of human life, unsafe plants expose their operators to huge economic costs. Besides being liable for damage and loss of life due to accidents, unsafe workplaces have to pay employees more to work there. Insurers charge higher rates for unsafe plants they believe present a high risk of having to pay claims.

  • Chemical security legislation update

    The United States Congress is considering legislation to improve the safety of chemical plants. While a noble goal, this regulation has the potential to actually decrease chemical plant safety while increasing costs and destroying jobs at the same time.

    Currently the proposed legislation is in a senate committee. The following summary of chemical security legislation reports that Senator Frank Lautenberg, a New Jersey Democrat, may introduce a new bill on this topic.

    Debate over Chemical Plant Security Moves to the Senate

    By Beveridge & Diamond, P.C., April 21, 2010

    Following the House’s passage of a chemical plant security bill last November, the Senate has begun to turn its attention to the issue, with subcommittee hearings held in March and multiple bills either proposed or in the works. As in the House, the focus of contention thus far in the Senate has been the possible addition of inherently safer technology (“IST”) requirements into a reauthorization of the existing Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (“CFATS”) program.

    Background

    The security of chemical facilities has been a subject of increased concern since the September 11, 2001 attacks, when it became apparent that stores of hazardous chemicals are a logical target for terrorists. Members of Congress have agreed on the need for a federal chemical facility security program, but have disagreed sharply on the issue of making IST mandatory. IST refers to technological and procedural steps intended to reduce the potential for a hazardous chemical release, in contrast to security measures intended to deter sabotage of existing processes. IST measures typically involve modifying processes to reduce the quantity of hazardous chemicals used or stored, reducing temperatures or pressures, or replacing a hazardous chemical with a less hazardous one. While facilities are always free to reduce hazards in these ways, a mandatory IST approach would require facilities to examine their industrial processes to evaluate safer alternatives and would enable a government agency to compel facilities to adopt the changes that it concludes are justified.

    Click to continue reading at Beveridge & Diamond, P.C.

  • Chemical safety bill testimony heard

    This week the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs heard testimony on S.2996, titled “Continuing Chemical Facilities Antiterrorism Security Act of 2010.” This bill would extend the effective date of current chemical security regulations until 2015.

    In the House of Representatives, a bill has passed that contains provisions for Inherently Safer Technology (IST). The Senate bill does not contain these provisions.

    IST regulations seek to force companies to replace existing methods and raw materials with those deemed to be safer. But the legislation may not produce its intended effect. Stephen Poorman of the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates stated in his written testimony: “Inherent safety is a superficially simple but truthfully very complex concept, and one that is inherently unsuited to regulation. Any IST mandate is bound to create situations that will actually increase or transfer overall risks.”

    His testimony gave three examples of where a change to a process mandated by IST would actually increase the overall risk. For example, a process might use a toxic catalyst. Eliminating the use of the catalyst would mean the company has to increase the temperature and pressure of the process, two factors that work to increase risk. The end result might be a process with more risk than the original process.

    In her opening remarks, Senator Susan M. Collins gave another example of how IST might force more hazardous trucks on highways:

    According to one water utility located in an isolated area of the Northwest, if Congress were to force it to replace its use of gaseous chlorine with sodium hypochlorite, then the utility would have to use as much as seven times the current quantity of treatment chemicals to achieve comparable water quality results. In turn, the utility would have to arrange for many more bulk chemical deliveries, by trucks, into the watershed. The greater quantities of chemicals and increased frequency of truck deliveries would heighten the risk of an accident resulting in a chemical spill into the watershed. In fact, the accidental release of sodium hypochlorite into the watershed would likely cause greater harm to soils, vegetation and streams than a gaseous chlorine release in this remote area.

    IST regulations and mandates would also be very expensive, forcing manufacturers and even local water utilities to increase their prices, all for something that may not reduce risk. Furthermore, as Sen. Collins remarked, “The increased cost of a mandatory IST program may force chemical companies to simply transfer their operations overseas, costing American workers thousands of jobs.”

    Testimony is available on the committee’s hearing page. More information on this topic is available on this site at Chemical facility anti-terrorism standards.

  • Citizen lawsuits won’t enhance chemical safety

    Legislation currently under consideration in Congress will allow citizens to sue the Department of Homeland Security if they believe that chemical plants are not in compliance with new regulations.

    The new regulations — IST, or Inherently Safer Technology — are troubling enough, in that they may actually work against their stated goal of safety. Allowing citizens to bring lawsuits based on these regulations will create many problems.

    In a Washington Times piece, two Washington lawmakers explain the risks and dangers that this law will bring about:

    • “… civil lawsuits would necessitate DHS diverting its limited resources from its core mission — protecting American lives from terrorists.”
    • “… civil lawsuits, and the discovery process involved, could very well lead to the public disclosure of sensitive — even classified — security information about U.S. chemical facilities and DHS’ assessments of those facilities.”
    • “To allow civil lawsuits against DHS in this area has the real potential to make the American people less safe. DHS itself has warned Congress of the potential consequences.”

    The Endangered Species Act contains provisions that allow for citizen lawsuits. The result? The authors write: “As a result, biologists then divert their attention away from protecting species to responding to the lawsuit and reacting to any judicial decisions. In 2002, this brought the Fish and Wildlife Service to a standstill.”

    Let’s not saddle the Department of Homeland Security with the same burden.

  • Chemical plant security should be based on technology, not politics

    As Congress considers legislation that would force our nation’s chemical plants to make expensive changes in their processes and technologies, we need to make sure that we don’t cripple our economy just to appease a small group of environmental activists — all in the name of purportedly greater safety.

    That’s the danger we face from IST, or Inherently Safer Technology. What could be wrong with a law that contains such a noble goal as safety? It has to do with the complexity of a modern industrial economy providing the backdrop on which unintended consequences develop. A recent article in The Hill explains:

    IST is governed by the laws of physics and engineering, not the laws of politics and emotion. A reduction in hazard will result in a reduction in risk if, and only if, that hazard is not displaced or replaced by another hazard. Even if it were possible to simply switch from one chemical to another, switching often results in the mere transfer of risk from the chemical plant to some other entity, perhaps the surrounding community, with no actual risk-reduction registered. For example, a government mandate that forces a company to reduce the amount of a particular chemical at a facility could very well result in an increase in transportation and safety risk. The company still has to maintain the same level of production capacity and the only way to maintain current capacity is to increase the number of shipments — through the community — going into the chemical plant.

    The article also states that there’s no objective way to measure the notion of “inherently safer.” But there is an objective way to measure the costs that IST will impose on manufacturers and our economy. It’s a huge cost, both in terms of dollars and lost jobs. Even the Wichita water treatment plant is on a list of facilities targeted by environmental extremists as dangerous.

    Chemical manufacturers, says the author, aren’t opposed to safety. In fact, the industry places great emphasis on safety and has spent billions on plant security since 9/11.

  • Chemical security bill passes committee

    On Tuesday, the United States House Energy and Commerce Committee’s Energy and Environment Subcommittee passed H.R. 2868, the “Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Act of 2009.”

    This bill contains provisions for Inherently Safer Technology (IST). These regulations seek to force companies to replace existing methods and raw materials with those deemed to be safer. But the legislation may not produce its intended effect. Congressional testimony found that this could actually increase risk to the businesses that the bill intends to protect.

    The problem, as with much government regulation, lies in the unintended consequences. The article Inherently Safer Technology (IST) not always that explains how these regulations can work to increase the real danger that Americans might face. In this example, a switch to a different input chemical would mean many more chemical tanker trucks would be on our nation’s highways.

    Chemical manufacturing and processing is a complicated matter, and mandates that force the use of one chemical instead of another can have consequences that lead to less safety, not more.

    In a letter to Henry Waxman and Joe Barton, Chair and Ranking Members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Charles T. Drevna, the president of the National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, told how “The bill’s IST provisions may result in simply transferring risk to other points along the supply chain instead of reducing risks as intended.”

    He also said that these mandates will increase cost: “Not only will IST mandates fail to reduce risk, but they will also impose significant financial hardship on refiners and petrochemical producers struggling in the current economic recession. In addition to the fact that mandated switches may not reduce risk, some estimates indicate that forced changes could cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars per facility.”

    There are existing regulations that have been effect for some time, and have proven to work. As one industry group wrote earlier this year: “The current chemical security regulations are enforced by the Department of Homeland Security, which has clear authority to inspect facilities and apply strong penalties for non-compliance. Since the regulations have been in place, not one incident as a result of terrorism has occurred. These regulations have been effective.”

    We have working regulations in place. So why are we contemplating more burdensome regulations that will surely increase cost, while at the same time increasing the risks Americans face?

  • Good news on chemical security

    There’s been some good news from Congress recently about Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, or CFATS. The National Association of Manufacturers reports:

    The Senate last week passed H.R. 2892, the Department of Homeland Security’s appropriations bill, which included a one-year extension of department’s authority over security for chemical facilities potentially threatened by terrorist attacks. This one-year extension helps continue the progress that the agency and chemical industry have made in implementing safety and security regulations adopted in 2007, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. (CFATS).

    The House has also passed a one-year extension, and the approach is far superior to the permanent legislation passed by the House Homeland Security Committee, H.R. 2868, the Chemical Facility Antiterrorism Act. That seemingly well-intentioned piece of legislation would U.S. production and storage of chemicals more burdensome and costly while providing no benefit public safety or national security.

    Bill Allmond, vice president of government relations at the Society of Chemical Manufacturers and Affiliates (SOCMA), put it well: “As we have argued for the past several months, Congress needs to address the October 2009 CFATS deadline expeditiously. Because the House appears, so far, to be more interested in passing controversial amendments like inherently safer technology (IST) to the existing regulations rather than make the rules permanent, this extension is the most responsible action.”

    Link to original story: Chemical Security: Keeping A Good Start Going. More reporting on this issue may be read by clicking on Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards.

  • Inherently Safer Technology (IST) not always that

    Currently Congress is considering new regulations for chemical plants — Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards or CFATS — that will, if enacted, require substitution of technologies believed to be less vulnerable to terrorist attack.

    These regulations would affect facilities in addition to those we usually picture when thinking of chemical plants. The Wichita water treatment plant, for example, could be affected.

    The problem is that chemical manufacturing and processing is a complicated matter, and mandates that force the use of one chemical instead of another can have consequences that lead to less safety.

    An example of this may be found in the study Petroleum Refiners & Inherently Safer Technology: The Realities of Hydrofluoric and Sulfuric Acid. (I recommend reading the executive summary.) It’s from the National Petrochemical & Refiners Association, a national trade association.

    Proponents of IST would like oil refineries to switch to sulfuric acid as a safer alternative to hydrofluoric acid. This sounds like a reasonable measure, until you dig a little deeper. Then, you’ll find this:

    The alkylation process takes roughly 250 times more sulfuric acid than hydrofluoric acid to achieve the same result; therefore, a forced switch to sulfuric acid would result in a significant increase in transportation and transfer of the substance. For a 10,000 barrel per day alkylation unit, this equates to one to two truckloads of hydrofluoric acid delivered to the refinery each month, compared to three to four truckloads of regenerated sulfuric acid coming in and three to four truckloads of spent sulfuric acid going out each day.

    This is an example of how seemingly small shifts in technology can have a big impact. In this case, many more trucks carrying a still-dangerous acid would be on our roads and highways.

    There’s also a cost consideration: “A mandate for a refinery to switch from hydrofluoric acid to sulfuric acid will result in capital and design costs between $45 and $150 million dollars per refinery and an increase in operating costs of between 200 and 400 percent.”

    As all refineries would face these costs, it’s very likely that these costs would be passed on to consumers. Except: foreign refiners would not be subject to these expensive technology requirements. This raises the possibility of the United States importing gasoline in large quantities — an unintended consequence that I don’t believe Congress intends.

  • Homeland Security may impose new regulations on agriculture

    At the Kansas Meadowlark, there’s some video about Chemical facility anti-terrorism standards.

    The video is from recent Congressional hearings, and is valuable for its explanation of Inherently Safer Technologies, or IST. Click on Homeland Security may impose new regulations on agriculture for the video and commentary.