The streets and highways, and certainly the public parks, are examples of public goods. Public goods are characterized by two things: nonexcludability, meaning that non-payers can’t be excluded from enjoying and using the good, and nonrivalrous consumption, meaning that consumption of the good by one person doesn’t reduce the availability of the good to others. Neither applies to an arena.

Roads and highways, to a large extent, are paid for by those who use them. As far as I know, I paid for the entire cost of street in front of my house through special tax assessments. It is reasonable that I pay for that street, as I use it extensively. In the broader case, a large source of funding for roads and highways is the gasoline tax, which is an attempt to ask those who use and benefit from the resource to pay for it.

Some roads, such as toll roads, require their users, and potentially only their users, to pay for them.

The proposed downtown Wichita arena or Kansas Coliseum benefits only those who actually attend events. This is especially so in the case of the Coliseum, as downtown arena supporters readily point out that there has been no development surrounding it. We can easily identify those who benefit from an arena or stadium because they rent the facility or buy tickets to attend events. So it is very easy to ask them, and no one else, to pay.

The WSU Center for Economic Development and Business Research study (reported by Fred Mann in the September 5 Wichita Eagle), showing a small loss for the proposed downtown arena, does not account for the cost of building the arena. Neither do the Qwest Center in Omaha nor the Alltel Arena in Arkansas when they report their profits. How do I know? I wrote to each of these facilities and asked. None include any expense for depreciation, debt service, lease payments, or anything that recognizes the tremendous amount of capital consumed by building these arenas. Yet, these facilities report a profit, or perhaps a negligibly small loss.

I have found that the arenas I have looked at (Qwest, Alltel, and the proposed Wichita) don’t account for the cost of the capital consumed in building them. For example, the projected profit (actually a small loss) for the proposed Wichita downtown arena includes no expense taken for depreciation. Now it is true, that being a government entity, the downtown arena wouldn’t pay taxes, and therefore depreciation expense doesn’t help it reduce its income taxes. But an allowance for depreciation helps us to recognize that a large amount of money was spent to build this arena, and that money has a correspondingly large opportunity cost. Indeed, GASB 34 requires governments to start depreciating their assets, and Mr. Chris Chronis, the Chief Financial Officer of Sedgwick County, has told me that the county will take depreciation expense for the downtown arena, or for a remodeled Kansas Coliseum, for that matter.

My investigation and a series of email messages with Mr. Ed Wolverton revealed that the WSU center that prepared the estimate of profitability for the proposed downtown arena wasn’t aware that the county would be required to calculate depreciation expense.

Government Accounting Standards Board Statement 34 requires governments to account for the cost of their assets, usually by stating depreciation expense each year. Through a series of email exchanges with Mr. Ed Wolverton, President of the Wichita Downtown Development Corporation, I have learned that the WSU Center for Economic Development and Business Research was not aware of this requirement when they prepared their forecast. Mr. Wolverton admitted this after checking with the study authors.

Mr. Chris Chronis, Chief Financial Officer of Sedgwick County, in an email conversation told me that the county will take depreciation expense for the downtown arena, or for a renovated Kansas Coliseum, for that matter.

I appeared in a story on a local television station where I presented research I had read showing that if new development occurs around a downtown arena, it would likely be economic activity that formerly took place somewhere else in town. This is the “substitution effect.” Mr. Wolverton appeared in the same story and state that due to time constraints, the WSU study did not study these effects.

It seems that the best argument that arena supporters have for asking the entire community to pay for the Downtown Wichita arena is that it will somehow pay for itself through spillover economic benefit. That is, through increased economic development around a downtown arena, the citizens of Sedgwick County will somehow be repaid for their investment in the arena through the taxes they paid.

Current economic research indicates otherwise, as follows.

A review of the book “Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums” by Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, available at this url at the Brookings Institution: https://www.brookings.edu/press/books/sports.htm states in part: “The primary conclusions are: first, sports teams and facilities are not a source of local economic growth and employment; second, the magnitude of the net subsidy exceeds the financial benefit of a new stadium to a team; and, third, the most plausible reasons that cities are willing to subsidize sports teams are the intense popularity of sports among a substantial proportion of voters and businesses and the leverage that teams enjoy from the monopoly position of professional sports leagues.”

Another important paper, “Identifying the Real Costs and Benefits of Sports Facilities” is available at this url: http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/671_chapin-web.pdf. This is from the conclusion: “A pro-facility argument that rests solely on the magnitude of the economic benefits conferred by a new facility is unsustainable. The economic impact literature has ended once and for all the argument that the economic impact of these projects justifies public subsidies for new sports facilities.”

From a paper titled “Professional Sports Facilities, Franchises and Urban Economic Development (UMBC Economics Department Working Paper 03-103)” available at http://www.umbc.edu/economics/wpapers/wp_03_103.pdf we can read this about the impact of sports facilities:

Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) recently surveyed the growing literature on retrospective studies of the economic impact of sports facilities and franchises on local economies. The literature published in peer-reviewed academic journals differs strikingly from the predictions in “economic impact studies.” No retrospective econometric study found any evidence of positive economic impact from professional sports facilities or franchises on urban economies. While evidence exists suggesting that narrowly defined occupational groups, like workers employed in the sports industry (SIC Code industry 79 — Recreation and Amusements), benefit from the construction of new sports facilities, building new sports facilities and attracting new professional sports teams did not raise income per capita or total employment in any US city. In fact, some research has found a negative economic impact of professional sports on urban economies.

Later, from the same paper:

Coates and Humphreys (2003) extended this research to examine the earnings and employment in narrowly-defined occupational groups in US cities with professional sports teams. In this study, the earnings and employment in the SIC-code industry containing sports facilities and teams — SIC-code 79, Amusements and Recreation — were higher but the earnings and employment in other important sectors like Retail Trade, Hotels, and Eating and Drinking Establishments were lower. The economic benefit from sports facilities and franchises appears to be concentrated in a small sector of the economy and comes at the expense of other sectors of urban economies.

If, then, it appears that the community-wide economic benefit that arena supports claim will not materialize, the people who benefit from the arena are quite easy to identify. They buy tickets to events, or they rent the arena. These are the people who should pay its cost.